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TEDDY AND HOWIE ARE BACK: THE RETURN
OF THE JUDICIAL NOMINATION PROCEDURE,
PART VI
ANN H. COULTER*

Although the past forty or so years of judicial tyranny must
have given pause to the most devoted constitutional cultist, the
nation is at last on the verge of reaping the benefits of its brilliant
Constitution. For a long while, the Constitution's division of powers and its checks and balances seemed to have been outwitted by
the body charged with deciding cases under that document. Not
only was the Supreme Court rapaciously seizing powers that properly resided with other branches of government and, most often,
with the states, but also it seemed impervious to the Senate's
power of impeachment under the Constitution, despite public indignation reaching record highs. 1
But despite the Justices' manifest understanding of their powers, they are not, after all, immortal. Where the threat of impeachment was ineffective, replacement is not. And as the Justices
cash in their chips, the pent-up indignation of the silent majority-or technically, the silenced majority-that once found expression only in impotent highway billboards demanding Earl
Warren's impeachment, now constitutes a relevant political force.
So relevant a force is it, that conservatives are virtually guaranteed ultimate triumph in the war for the courts. Liberal factions
* Ann Hart Coulter was an attorney with the Department of Justice and clerked on the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit after graduating from the University of Michigan Law School. She now practices law in New York City.
' U.S. CONST, art. I, §3, cls. 6 & 7. That the Constitution erected barriers to the easy
removal of judges was evident to the principal theoreticians of the Constitution, who defended the insularity of the judiciary, along with the provision for life tenure of judges, on
the grounds that independence was indispensable to an effective judiciary. THE FEDERALIST
No. 79 (Alexander Hamilton). Importantly, however, the judicial branch was also said to
"have neither force nor will as did the other two branches, "prov[ing] incontestably that
the judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments of power." Id.
No. 78, at 465-66 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Consequently the
prospect of tyranny by the judiciary was dismissed as "the imaginary danger of a superannuated bench." Id. No. 79, at 475 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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may win occasional battles, such as their defeat of Judge Bork, but
in the long run, victory belongs to conservatives. Judicial "precedents" grounded on illegitimate power grabs are not built to last.
Not only have the long-time losers become invincible winners,
but the terms of the battle have radically changed. Indeed, it is
because the instruments of war have changed that the once defeated are now ascendant. Moreover, the panzers are no longer on
one side only. Not long ago, the wish list of the American Civil
Liberties Union became the law of the land with no more fuss and
bother than was required to pilot a legal dispute to the Supreme
Court. Defeating judicial nominations of conservatives, however,
takes more than a five vote majority on the Court.
The process by which new judges are made is admittedly not a
pristine model of participatory democracy but nor is the decision
made in secrecy by nine elites and then zapped down like a thunderbolt from Mount Olympus. Senators who reject a nominee
chosen by the popularly elected President cannot waltz away from
their votes without some explanation to constituents. The novelty
of the governed having some influence on their governors has
made the judicial nomination process a captivating spectacle full
of brilliant ironies and sophistries.
One of the many ironies surrounding the process is that the invidious "strict constructionists"-people who attempt to assign
meaning to the passages of the Constitution, as opposed to randomly assigning constitutional passages to meanings they
like-openly accord a broader role to the Senate under the "advice and consent" rubric of Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution than do the foes of strict constructionism, who ought to have
opposed every nominee to the Supreme Court since John Paul
Stevens. After all, these later nominees threatened to at least cite
provisions of the Constitution, rather than Henry David Thoreau,
in their opinions.2
Article II of the Constitution gives the President the "Power,
by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate . . .[to] appoint
' See Papachristo v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972) (citing Henry. David
Thoreau, for proposition that ambulatory activities are "historically part of the amenities
of life" in overturning municipal vagrancy law).
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is thus explicitly required. No grounds upon which consent may
be withheld are mentioned nor is there any other indication that
sheer political opposition is beyond the pale. Indeed, it would
seem to require the sort of linguistic machinations deftly produced by artisans Brennan and Blackmun to torture a definition
of "consent" that would exclude political disagreements.
Peculiarly, however, the same people who could see as plain as
day a right to abortion in the sarcoids on the tumors of various
constitutional amendments and who opposed any nominees who
did not have similar powers of discernment, suddenly act as if they
are circumscribed by the Advice and Consent Clause from opposing a judicial nominee for reasons other than "judicial temperament," "qualifications," or fabricated charges of moral turpitude.
One suspects that something other than the language of the Constitution is responsible for the extraordinarily demure interpretation certain Senators have given their role in the nomination
process.
But, of course, the Senators and citizens who dread the dismantling of "constitutional" doctrines assembled by the will of judicial
activists in the last several decades cannot forthrightly state their
opposition to the Reagan and Bush nominees on that ground for
the exact same reason they fear a conservative court: they realize
that a majority of Americans oppose much of what the Court has
enacted under the aegis of "constitutional law." Were it otherwise, life tenured, unelected elites would not be so exclusively depended upon to enact the liberals' social agenda.
Suppose in lieu of judicial fiats, national referenda had been
held on every relatively important decision between 1954 and
1988 concerning, for example, the Free Speech and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment, the Search and Seizure
Clause of the Fourth Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and the penumbras and emanations
clauses of indeterminate amendments. In what percentage of
these cases would the results have been substantially the same?
Ten percent would be an extremely charitable estimate. Not for
' U.S. CoNsr. art I, §2.
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nothing, the whole point of these cases was to toss out the laws of
state legislatures, which are composed of democratically elected
representatives. Whatever may be said about democratically
elected state legislatures, they are certainly a more plausible barometer of the public interest than is Harry Blackmun.
Although conservative judicial nominees do not threaten to impose their own policy preferences on the nation in the guise of
interpreting the Constitution-and even if they did, Warren
Court lovers would not be in much of a position to protest-they
do promise to remove the flotsam dumped by the Court in the
way of democratically determined laws concerning issues outside
the dictates of the Constitution. Thus, even the liberal imagination has not presumed to concoct charges that conservative nominees will misconstrue actual provisions of the Constitution itself,
or, indeed, Supreme Court rulings for the first three-quarters of
the Constitution's history. Rather, all that has been suggested is
that conservative Justices will not hew to various "precedents" invented by the Court in the last quarter of that body's existence.
Deference to the Constitution over the recent fabrications of
Brennan & Co. is what is meant by "judicial activism on the
right."
Obviously though, were these widely popular rulings, there
would be no danger because the holdings would be swiftly reincarnated as statutes. Senators opposed to conservative nominees
are in the unenviable position of fighting to preserve judicial
precedents that, it must be assumed, could never have made their
way into this world as statutes, that, in other words, a majority of
Americans do not much like.
So the Senator who draws campaign contributions from People
for the American Way is in a bit of a pickle. He must oppose any
nominee who poses a threat to the judge-made law that could
never have been enacted through normal democratic processes,
but the reasons he gives for his opposition must not jeopardize his
own position-which he owes to the normal democratic processes.
Consequently, instead of announcing that they opposed the nominations of, for example, Judges Bork and Thomas because their
ascension to the high Court would likely send issues such as abortion, school prayer, pornography, and school districting back to
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state legislatures, the lion's share of Senators in opposition
claimed to have rejected these men on the basis of qualifications,
judicial temperament or questions of character. Remember this
the next time someone accuses Clarence Thomas of dissembling
under oath.
Besides being disingenuous though, the putative reasons that
have been offered for opposing conservative nominees are transparently ludicrous. To begin with, this fixation on the qualifications and character of the nominees is droll, at best, in light of the
qualifications and character of other men who have been elevated
to that post. Moreover, doubt about "qualifications" is a spurious
claim in the case of Thomas and a laughable one leveled at Bork;
questions of "judicial temperament" and "character" are asinine
vis-a-vis Bork and demonstrably absurd in the case of Thomas-as
was so demonstrated.
Not only would it be political suicide for the majority of Senators to be explicit about which "precedents" they do not want
overruled, but also several decades of judicial activism have
largely sapped our legislative branch of courageous men. With
few exceptions, most congressmen have convictions about nothing
beyond their right to be re-elected. Those legislators who loathe
the fall of Roe v. Wade surely do so not out of a deep abiding commitment to abortion, but out of a deep abiding commitment to
their never having to take a stand on a controversial issue. And
this, the Supreme Court has made easy-indeed, inevitable-by
issuing judicial edicts covering the most volatile issues of the day.
Questions such as whether one's town will feature porn shops
and strip joints; whether there shall be prayer in the local schools;
whether abortion should be outlawed as murder or permitted,
perhaps funded, as a vital medical procedure; and whether the
death penalty is an appropriate punishment for certain crimes are
far more important to the average American than any questions
in those areas of the field the Court did not close to legislation by
actual legislatures. It is the ordinary aspects of everyday life rather
than global concerns that almost uniformly have been raised to
"constitutional" issues by the Court, and it is the mundane that is
most arresting to normal people. Consider this: what is likely to
upset a person more-100,000 people dying in an earthquake in
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India or his dog dying? The question is absurdly rhetorical. This
is why the confirmation hearings of Supreme Court nominees
rather than tedious, droning budget debates receive around-theclock coverage by CNN.
Consequently, the principal activities of our elected representatives often seem to consist exclusively of designating honorary
weeks ("National Gerontologist Appreciation Week") and striking
postures on the deficit. Even the apparent wrangling over the deficit is a non-issue. Once President Bush broke his pledge not to
raise taxes, partisan bickering over "the budget" became precisely
as important and relevant as two imbeciles wrestling for the right
to milk a he-goat: the only question being debated was how much
our taxes-and their salaries-would be increased. Moreover, the
deficit has never been a big issue with voters. Having run on the
deficit for about forty years with little voter response, Republicans
were noticeably delighted when the Democrats first picked up the
deficit as a campaign issue in the 1984 election.
This is not to say that candidates for national, state, and local
legislatures have had no issues on which to take positions and differentiate themselves, but they have certainly not been the sort of
issues to get any but the most devoted political animal to join in
pamphleteering, door-to-door solicitations, rallies, or really any
great effort on behalf of a particular candidate. Indeed, the issues
that have permitted distinctions among candidates have apparently not been sufficient to persuade a nontrivial number of people to bother voting. While massive campaigns are waged to increase voter registration,4 little thought has been given to the
perfectly rational reason for the voters' ennui.
Not surprisingly, many of the most hotly contested issues in
congressional and other legislative elections are those the Su' A recent effort in this cause is Kentucky Senator Wendell Ford's bill, S. 250, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) that would compel the states to adopt a panoply of measures
designed to increase voter registration. The bill's mandated registration methods would
include automatic registration upon applying for a driver's license, unless specifically refused by the applicant; registration by mail; and distribution of registration applications at
local welfare and other public offices. When substantial segments of the population are
more likely to queue up for driver's licenses and welfare benefits than to exercise their
right to vote, a right people are literally dying for in many parts of the world just now,
there are problems with our system of representative democracy more profound than complex registration systems.
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preme Court has already usurped from the states and Congress. A
candidate's position on crime, racial issues and, most obviously,
abortion, continue to be some of the most important campaign
issues. And that is in spite of the extremely limited number of
ways a congressman can affect any of these concerns. It is these
issues, especially abortion, that inspire political action committees,
fund-raising groups, protests, and letter-writing campaigns. And
as retirement season has gotten underway for our octogenarian
Justices, the impact an elected official is presumed to have on the
replacement choice has become a crucial, often the crucial, election issue.
Thus, in the wake of the Thomas confirmation, several feminist
organizations vowed to target certain Senators for defeat in future
elections solely on the basis of their votes in favor of the nominee-and no one found this unusual. But why should they? The
sort of Supreme Court nominee a President is likely to tap and a
Senator likely to approve is one of the few remaining issues which
distinguish the democratic and republican candidacies.5 In fact,
what may be most striking about the feminists' warning is that
even as a threat it is futilely distant from the real levers of power.
So what if they could defeat the handful of Senators on their
blacklist? Each Senator is responsible for only one of one hundred
votes and, even then, the best that can be hoped for is to defeat a
Bork and a Ginsberg only to wind up with a Justice Kennedy.
Representative democracy has devolved to the point that the
only way a citizen can hope to influence decisions about the things
that concern him most is not through his vote in mayoral, gubernatorial, state legislative, or even, particularly, congressional or
senatorial elections, but in the presidential election. And this is
only because the winning candidate may have a chance to replace
one or two Justices on the Supreme Court. That body, the nation's super-legislature, will then determine whether every state,
municipality, and village in the nation will or will not be permitted
to: provide the death penalty; have prayer in its schools or creches
in its parks; outlaw abortion; restrict access to pornography; allow
6 Of late, the parties' other distinguishing features have begun to fade away: the Cold
War is over and neither party seems able to resist raising taxes.
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the use of a variety of evidence in criminal trials; indeed, even
determine whether and what types of "psychological pressure"
police may apply to criminal suspects to induce confessions.6
This is why it was absolute insanity for conservatives to pretend
to have been shocked and hurt by the massive political campaign
waged against Robert Bork. Of course there was going to be a
blood bath: Judge Bork would have given a fifth vote essentially to
the Republicans in the most powerful body in the land. To be
sure, conservative Republicans had steadfastly opposed the judicial encroachments and outright pillage of the powers that properly resided with the other branches and more frequently, the
states. Under the Republicans', and concededly, most Democrats',
conception of the Supreme Court, the confirmation hearings of
candidates nominated to this "least dangerous" branch7 ought to
be noncontroversial, largely tedious affairs. This conception of the
Court, however, had not been carrying the day for approximately
four decades.
Patently there should not be political battles over Supreme
Court nominations. But just as obviously there should not be Supreme Court rulings having anything to do with abortion, contraception, pornography, and a myriad of other subjects the Court
has uninhibitedly expounded upon in the past.' After forty years
of Court opinions that read like Norman Lear's belief system, to
nominate the man who would be the fifth "conservative" vote on
the Court and then sit back and petulantly complain that liberals
were politicizing the Court by campaigning against him is on the
O See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404-05 (1977) (police officer's speech to murder
suspect describing desire of victim's parents to locate victim's body in order to give it
Christian burial, which persuaded suspect to lead police to body, held violative of Sixth
Amendment right to counsel).
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Whoever attentively considers the different departments of power must perceive
that, in a government in which they are separated from each other, the judiciary,
from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political
rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure
them.
Id.
' If Congress were to outlaw, for example, speech on behalf of a right to abortion, the
Court would of course be within proper bounds in declaring the law unconstitutional. But
that would be a decision about speech, not abortion. There is a Free Speech Clause; there
is not an Abortion Clause, an IUD Clause, or a Screw Magazine Clause.
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order of taking Ted Bundy to task for not thanking his date for a
lovely evening after decapitating her. The Supreme Court has no
more been what it ought to be than Ted Bundy was what a date
should be.
Although Republicans were silly, Democrats, or more properly,
liberals, have been the big losers. Instead of Judge Bork, they got
Anthony Kennedy, mild-mannered Clark Kent during the confirmation hearings turned right-wing Superman on the Court. By all
accounts Justice Kennedy's record is, if anything, more conservative than Bork's would likely have been. 9 Furthermore, although
many Americans briefly considered Judge Bork capable of the
most carnal evils, by about the seventh or eighth week that Bork's
book was on the New York Times' best seller list, the realization set
in that they had been hoodwinked.
The Bork experience induced sufficient cynicism in the populace that by the time of the Thomas hearings, the period of enlightenment had been shortened to roughly forty-eight hours. If
getting Kennedy rather than Bork on the Supreme Court was still
a base hit for conservatives, the sexual harassment hearings were a
home run. In the course of one weekend, almost every important
organ of the liberal establishment had been exposed as never
before: the media, the feminists, the civil rights establishment, the
special interest groups, and the ultra-liberal Senators on the Senate Judiciary Committee.
Because of the extraordinary, lurid nature of the charges
against Thomas, all of America was witnessing, first-hand, the actual event while simultaneously observing the media's presentation of it. No amount of mere skepticism about the press could
have equivalently revealed the media's persistent drumbeat in
favor of Anita Hill and against Clarence Thomas. The New York
Times/CBS poll-taken evenhandedly and objectively after all of
Hill's witnesses had appeared but before any of Thomas's
' See, e.g., Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3163 (1990) (Justice Kennedy voting with
majority in opinion that held Confrontation Clause did not require face-to-face confrontation with child witness charging defendant with child abuse). Noticeably, Justice Scalia dissented on grounds that would have been persuasive to Bork-that the language of the
Constitution made no such exception. Id. at 3171 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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had' 0 -showed that sixty-two percent of Americans believed that
Clarence Thomas was telling the truth and fifty-eight percent believed Anita Hill was lying.1 1 And this was before J.C. Alvarez and
the indomitable Phyllis Berry, among others, had testified. Yet the
major media not only assumed the truth of Hill's charges from the
outset, but rushed in with excuses and explanations for each additional crack in Hill's story.
Maureen Dowd's "news" report on the front page of the New
York Times the day after Thomas was confirmed is synecdochical of
the press's presentation of the story. Under the headline "Image
More Than Reality Became Issue, Losers Say," Dowd's news report commented of the Senate that had just confirmed the
nominee:
This is the sort of deliberative body, after all, where Richard
C. Shelby, the Democratic Senator from Alabama who had
been getting calls running 9 to 1 in favor of Judge Thomas,
decided to vote his conscience live this morning with Katie
Couric on the NBC program
"Today." He decided to vote in
12
favor of confirmation.
A companion piece, just above Dowd's report, interpreted votes
against the nominee with somewhat less cynicism: "Three [Senators], all of them Democrats, admitted by switching their votes
that they had found the record of the [sexual harassment] confrontation clear-cut and convincing."'" At least Anna Quindlen
had possessed the grace to precede one of her many op-ed polemics in favor of Hill with the observation that "[t]he good thing
about writing an opinion column is that you can have an opinion."" The distinction between opinion and nonopinion pieces
10 Also evenhanded and objective was the decision of every A.M. band radio station
broadcasting to New York City, to cut what had been continuous coverage of the sexual
harassment hearings approximately thirty minutes into the testimony of Thomas's
witnesses.
" Elizabeth Kolbert, The Thomas Nomination; Most in National Survey Say Judge is the More
Believable, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 15, 1991, at Al.
12 Maureen Dowd, The Thomas Confirmation; Image More Than Reality Became Issue, Losers
Say, N.Y. TiMEs, Oct. 16, 1991, at AI.

" Adam Clymer, The Thomas Confirmation: Senate's Futile Search for Safe Ground, N.Y.

TIMES, Oct. 16, 1991, at Al.
14 Anna Quindlen, Public & Private; An American Tragedy, N.Y.

TIMES,

Oct. 12, 1991, § 1,
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was not readily apparent during the sexual harassment hearings.
To be sure, the liberal bias of the media was not likely to be a
shocking new discovery for most Americans. What was unusual
about the sexual harassment hearings was not only that all of
America was watching both the unraveling of the story line as well
as the media's version of that story, but that the liberal claque in
the press had an unusually fevered pitch this time. Tendentiousness like this does not result from honest journalists inadvertently
allowing their prejudices to show; this was the handiwork of the
feminists.
Until the sexual harassment hearings, feminist theories about
the oppression of women have remained in the ghettos of
academia without ever having been subjected to any critical examination by the population at large. Indeed, the snippets and
phrases of feminist causes that have made their way into popular
discourse sound utterly noncontroversial. "Date rape" ostensibly
refers to a man who straightforwardly rapes his date; "sexual harassment" conjures images of a boss demanding sex from his
subordinate; "comparable worth" seems to demand no more than
that a woman receive the same pay as a man for performing the
identical job. Occasionally, the more representative aspects of
feminist theory slip into public, such as the "substantial ferment
within the feminist community over . . . whether a reasonably
clear line can be drawn between forced heterosexual encounters
. . . and mutually chosen heterosexual encounters.' '"1 But these
are presumed to be merely fringe elements of an otherwise mainstream pro-women movement, rather than the very heart of feminist theory.
Thus, for example, contrary to uneducated opinion, "date
rape" is not defined as a man who rapes his date-that would be
"rape" unqualified,' 6 but rather describes a scenario indistinguishable from the typical manner in which most couples first have conat 29.
" Mary Irene Coombs, Crime in the Stacks, or A Tale of A Text: A Feminist Response to a
Criminal Law Textbook, 38 J.OF LEGAL EDUC. 117, 124 n.44 (1988); see also ANDREA DWORKIN, INTERCOURSE (1987); SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE (1987).
" Although feminists would have one believe that they invented the crime with which
William Kennedy Smith was charged, Smith was accused of rape, technically "sexual battery," not of "date sexual battery." The former has been unlawful for some time now.
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sensual premarital sex, but for the female's inscrutable state of
mind.17 And "sexual harassment" as defined by the feminists need
not be threatening-mildly annoying will do. Most insidious
though, is the feminist article of faith that once a charge of sexual
harassment, date rape, or, of course, real rape has been leveled, it
must be accepted as true without possibility of disproof. This is
not just a presumption of guilt until proved innocent, which itself
would turn notions of justice and fairness upside down. The accusation is true by virtue of being made.
These feminist innovations in the law made a resounding debut
during the Thomas hearings. When Hill's charges first hit the airwaves, many of those unfamiliar with the mores of the judicial activism devotees, and also unfamiliar with Thomas, must have tentatively assumed the veracity of the accusations. There is a natural
inclination-of humans, if not the American judicial system-to
believe people are guilty as charged. While the press and the
court may refer to "the accused" and "the suspect," the casual
observer thinks "the murderer," "the rapist," or "the robber."
But the story has to work, it must maintain some intuitive believability. Hill's story was at its apogee of plausibility when first announced. After that, it became less and less believable at every
turn. Why would she continue to work with a man whose vulgarity upset her to the point of hospitalization? Most peculiar, why
would she move with him from the Department of Education to
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")?
Rationalizations abounded for Hill's extraordinary decision to
follow her harasser, as well they should have. If he really said all
these things in the sinister manner she described, neither Hill nor
any person would have switched jobs so as to continue working
under Thomas. But Hill's explanation that the harassment seemed
to have stopped is inconsistent with her depiction of the harassment, her claimed reaction to it, and her raising the charges with
17 Date rape generally entails a girl consenting, perhaps slowly or grudgingly, to at least
the first several steps of a romantic tussle with her date, which then leads to sex. She need
not vocally object to sex, provided she never explicitly consents to it. Having brunch with
the putative date rapist the next morning, or even going on another date with him does
not disqualify such a scenario from constituting "date rape." Written contracts of consent
are to be recommended. See generally Tamar Lewin, Tougher Laws Mean More Cases Called
Rape, N.Y. TiMes, May 27, 1991, at 1, 8.
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the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"). She stated: "it wasn't
as though it happened every day. But, I went to work knowing
that it might happen." 8 If there were only five to ten incidents
during a four-year period though, how long a lapse would it take
to annihilate her claimed fear "that it might happen"?
And even assuming that any lapse could be long enough to
wholly eliminate the unpleasant anticipation of yet more such incidents, Hill did not claim that Thomas's comments merely embarrassed her or upset her for a day or so-she said she was traumatized by them. So pervasive was her resulting distress that she was
hospitalized for five days with acute stomach pains putatively on
account of the harassment.' 9 Even if she could have known to a
moral certainty that no more harassment would ensue, it is highly
implausible that she would relish the company of a man whose
behavior was capable of traumatizing her to this degree.
Finally, she reported the harassment to the FBI during its background check on Thomas. By providing her story to the FBI she
indicated that she believed what he did to be wrong and so indicative of bad character that, even though she would never have to
work with Thomas again, the Senate should have been made
aware of his behavior before confirming him for a position of
some stature and importance. It would seem to be wholly irrelevant to Hill's move with Thomas to the EEOC, therefore, that the
harassment appeared to have stopped. She believed he was a bad
man for ever having done it.
Perceiving the obvious inadequacy of her own explanation,
Hill's claque in the media quickly set about manufacturing their
own excuses for her improbable behavior. It was said she was uncertain about her position at the Department of Education and
pessimistic about her prospects elsewhere. The fact that she was
not a political appointee and consequently possessed total job security was dismissed on the grounds that she might not have realized it-a risible claim to anyone who has ever worked for the
1" Hearings on the Supreme Court Nomination of Clarence Thomas, Committee on Judiciary,
United States Senate, 102d Cong., I st Sess. (1991) [hereinafter Thomas Hearings] available in
LEXIS, Legis library, Fednew file (all references to testimony etc., from the Thomas Hearings have been taken from this source).

19 Id.
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federal government in any capacity.
Alternatively it was posited that her fear was inspired by President Reagan's desire to abolish the Department of Education. Yet
Hill's division within the Department of Education is secured to
the same statutory anchor as is the EEOC-the 1964 Civil Rights
Act. Because that Act requires that some federal outpost monitor
nondiscrimination by recipients of federal grants irrespective of
whether those grants are distributed by a separate Education Department,20 Hill's particular position at the Department of Education could have been abolished only by repeal of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act. Such a repeal, however, was not only wholly implausible, but would have also eliminated her subsequent position at the
EEOC in any event. Moreover, if the actual facts, like the difference between a political and career position, are not something
Hill may be credited with knowing, it bears mentioning that the
EEOC was no more immune from the Reagan Administration's
war (rhetorical, as it turns out) against the federal Leviathan, than
was the Department of Education.
Most wonderful of all was the fact that absolutely no one in the
press would so much as acknowledge the problem her double victimhood posed to claims of professional insecurity. All of America
knew that a black woman who graduated from Yale Law School in
1980 would have precisely as much trouble landing any number
of well-paying prestigious jobs in 1982 as the President of the
United States would have being seated at Maison Blanche. But the
media considered this point too gauche to mention and therefore
proceeded to blather about Hill's tenuous. employment prospects
without a blush. Ultimately, there was no satisfactory explanation
for just this single discrepancy in Hill's story and there were too
many-far too many-unsatisfactory ones.
The question could not be avoided: What objective indicia
would Hill's boosters in the press accept as evidence of Thomas's
innocence? That she not only arranged a transfer to the EEOC
with the putative harasser but continued to place social calls to
him up until his marriage to Virginia Lamp? That no one else
2 Thus, prior to the creation of the Department of Education in 1980, the agency resided in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.
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stepped forward to testify to similar experiences, whereas thirteen
women who had worked with Thomas testified that they did not
believe it possible? That coworkers said they detected no discomfort in Hill during her contacts with Thomas? That Hill told no
one, either at the time of the harassment that allegedly
culminated in her hospitalization or at any time thereafter, anything about these traumatizing events beyond vague allegations of
"sexual harassment"-nothing about pubic hair, "Long Dong Silver," sex with animals, women with large breasts, or even a meager "he's talking to me about pornography"? That another man
claimed Hill had accused him of leading her on and that on that
basis he believed her to be "somewhat unstable" and that in his
case "she had fantasized about [his] being interested in her romantically?" 2 What else could have been shown that would finally
prompt the sexual harassment mavens to cry uncle, to admit that
Thomas had been falsely charged, or, really, to own up to even a
touch of gray concerning Thomas's guilt?
It is impossible-there is nothing. "Why else would she have
made the accusations" is all that was said and all that can be
said.2 2 And that sentiment is not only disingenuous-the reasons
were obvious and have only become more so, now that she has
"1Thomas

Hearings, supra note 18.

22 The only other somewhat subjective evidence briefly supporting Hill's credibility was

the detail she gave concerning the alleged discussions of pornography. Thus, for the first
twenty-four hours of the hearings, Hill supporters demanded to know how else an apparently prim law school professor could have possibly come up with "Long Dong Silver" or
the pubic hair line.
In the abstract, the only answer did seem to be that someone had said these things to Hill,
very possibly in a vulgar and harassing manner. And unlike the other straws grasped at by
the Hill claque, this query was at least founded on the rational concept of circumstantial
evidence rather than purely mystical intuition. Yet despite the wide currency immediately
gained by this apparent enigma, when Senator Hatch stunningly revealed alternative avenues by which even a prudish law professor would very likely have happened upon references to Long Dong Silver-a sexual harassment case in Lexis and Westlaw databases from
a court sitting in Hill's home state-and the pubic hair line-almost a verbatim quote from
the enormously popular book and movie The Exorcist-Hill supporters quietly dropped the
question and smugly feigned perplexity as to what could have prompted Hatch to mention
these sources in the first place. Thus, as the hearings grow more distant, one such Pecksniffian has described Hatch's coup de grace to the how-else-could-she-have-known line as part
of the "Republicans' attack [on] Professor Hill's credibility and character-suggesting she
may be . . . under the pornographic influence of The Exorcist." Mark Becker, An Inside
View: How the Senator and His Counsel Tried to Find Out Who Clarence Thomas Is, NAT'L L.J.,
Dec. 30, 1991, at S12, S15.
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begun her collection of awards, speaking engagements, and standing ovations-but also amounts to an admission that a charge of
sexual harassment must be accepted as true without possibility of
disproof. That part of the feminist agenda that dispenses with
fairness, objectivity, and rationality and that demands a finding of
guilt whenever a woman accuses a man, was finally laid bare
before all of America.
Like the feminists, the race relations industry makes the most
headway when confined to the realm of popular mythology. And
also like the feminists, actual facts tend to explode these myths.
The seemingly endless parade of talented and conservative blacks
testifying before the Judiciary Committee during the sexual harassment hearings rather conclusively gave the lie to the civil rights
coterie's portrayal of black America as nearly monolithic, and refuted as well the grudgingly negative opinion of Clarence Thomas
apparently held by the monolith. Phyllis Berry is the victim of no
one; Nancy Fitch is hardly a candidate for affirmative action bonus points; John Doggett is neither an oppressed unfortunate nor
an idealized super hero-his marvelous arrogance theatrically illustrated that blacks are capable of the same foibles as whites.
And all stood behind Thomas and against the liberal establishment with a fierceloyalty that made the spurious posturing of an
Al Sharpton and the other media-invented black celebrities despicable by comparison.
Not only the media, the feminists, and the race relations industry but every component of the liberal establishment, even those
not directly involved in the hearings in any way, was dealt a blow
by Hill's eleventh-hour allegations like never before. With liberals
and conservatives locked in a heated war over the Supreme Court,
everyone knew the Thomas nomination would instigate hostilities
but no one knew when or how. So while liberal groups called everyone who had worked for-or incidentally bumped intoThomas, rummaged through his garage, dug up his divorce papers, scrutinized his wife's background, and generally scoured the
nation for dirt on Thomas, all that conservatives could do was
wait and wonder what character assassination would ensue this
time around.
Bork had been routed with calumnies that he would single-

Teddy and Howie are Back
handedly revive back-alley abortions and segregated lunch counters; Ginsberg was brought down with the revelation that he had
smoked marijuana; Rehnquist was reviled, though not defeated
for Chief Justice, with allegations of race-baiting; and for a different post, John Tower had been finished off by a leak of womanizing reported in his FBI files-a leak that failed to include the
FBI's dismissal of these charges as unfounded.
Timing and strategy alone accounted for the relatively bloodless
nominations of Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, and David
Souter. Scalia would not constitute the fifth conservative vote on
the court and, in addition, was a sort of sacrificial lamb to give
credibility to the attack on Rehnquist. Kennedy was nominated in
the wake of the defeat of Bork and Ginsberg. Souter appeared to
have spoken to no one over the years other than his
mother-who fortunately was not a member of People for the
American Way (and for this, he was depicted as a Norman Bates
sort of psychotic in a full-page advertisement in the Village Voice).
It was like viewing the fourth of a series of horror movies that
had previously featured beheadings, poisonings, ax murders, and
torture. What would it be this time? Conservatives sat on the
edges of their seats, waiting, waiting, waiting. What could be next?
After all, Thomas was even better than a stealth nominee, as Kennedy and Souter had been called. He was the Arnold
Schwarzenegger of nominees. While Thomas was openly, not to
say aggressively, conservative, he seemed invincible by virtue of
his impeccable character, jolly demeanor, and stereotypical victimhood. Who would play the predator and when would he or she
strike?
It is precisely because the onslaught, or rather some onslaught,
was entirely anticipated that the sexual harassment allegations
from their inception seemed disingenuous to many. The demand
to know why Hill had not filed charges at the time of the alleged
harassment reflected not the incorrect assumption that charges
are invariably filed in cases of sexual harassment but the correct
assumption that the liberal special interest hit squads were intent
on detonating some sort of ideological time bomb against the conservative nominee and this was it.
Thomas had endured the real hearings without giving his politi-
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cal foes any nonpolitical grounds for rejecting his nomination.
Something had to be done. Thus, that a decade had passed since
the claimed harassment raised fewer eyebrows than the fact that
the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings had just passed, and
Thomas remained unscathed. It was the inevitability of a liberal
assault against the nominee that made Hill's accusations seem precisely as staged as the sixteenth murder in a horror film. Except
that at the movies, the victims are actors and the blood is not real.
If it was conservatism rather than any particular character defect of Thomas's that the liberal predator sought to destroy, it was
irrelevant which of the various special interest groups was to be
deployed against Thomas for that purpose. Of course, as Thomas
was black himself, stern lectures from Senator Kennedy on the
plight of blacks in America would be somewhat unseemly-though, come to think of it, no less unseemly then Kennedy's participation in a tribunal on sexual harassment. Still, aside
from race-baiting, any of the liberals' favorite bogeymen could
have been conjured up as easily as sexual harassment. Instead of
Long Dong Silver and pubic hair, Anita Hill might as well have
alleged that Thomas had privately made scathing remarks about
homosexuals, the homeless, or the noble porpoise.
Admittedly, these pet victims do not induce the same resonance
in the American people as do the liberals' Most Favored Causes,
Race and Sex. But the Aryan precision with which the Left has
attempted to sandbag every conservative judicial nominee assures
that whatever quarter the charge was to emanate from, the reaction would have been identical: Senator Metzenbaum would have
been every bit as venomous, Senator Biden just as unctuous, the
media precisely as tendentious, and the special-interest-group-ofthe-day comparably sanctimonious. It may have been plausible to
some Americans that Bork's 6pponents truly believed he was a
loose cannon, that Ginsberg was defeated because he had smoked
marijuana, and that Tower's detractors were morally offended by
his womanizing. By the time Justice Marshall resigned from the
Court, startling revelations about any nominee's past would have
been greeted with some skepticism. By the end of the sexual harassment hearings, the entire liberal establishment had been
discredited.

Teddy and Howie are Back
Even the puny Pyrrhic victory that might have been claimed by
the Left after the real hearings was forfeited during the sexual
harassment hearings. In addition to giving all of America a crash
course on feminism, the civil rights lobby, and special interest
groups in general, as well as a refresher course on the media, the
sexual harassment imbroglio must also have had its effect on
Thomas-Justice Thomas, that is.
The judicial nomination hearings are largely surplusage because
the nominees properly refuse to answer inappropriate questions,
and the nominees' responses to the inappropriate questions are all
that the Senators want to know: Will he cast his vote to preserve
or strike down the liberal social policies created by the Court over
the past several decades? Plainly, judicial nominees chosen by Republican Presidents tend not to be keen on judicial activism.
Thus, the sole purpose of the hearings is to terrorize the President into sending up judicial candidates who are at least capable
of moderating their enthusiasm for overruling recent precedent,
and to harangue and browbeat the nominees that do appear
before the Committee.
This latter function of the Committee is presumably not without result. The nominees that have survived the Committee's trial
by fire do seem to have been somewhat cowed by the experience.
Thus, for example, Justices Scalia, 3 Kennedy24 and Souter2 5 did
23 For examples of the increasingly conservative voting record of Justice Scalia, compare
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324-29 (1987) (holding that police officer's movement of
expensive stereo equipment in order to record serial numbers was illegal search under
Fourth Amendment where police legally entered defendant's premises to search for firearms and victims, after gun discharged from defendant's apartment injured man in apartment below) and Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 397-99 (1987) (overturning death
sentence because trial judge refused to consider "mitigating circumstances" beyond those
set forth in state statutes) with Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3058-59 (1990) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (concurring in opinion that gave states greater authority in death sentence
proceedings in evaluating mitigating or aggravating circumstances, specifically criticizing
Court's capital sentencing jurisprudence for being unduly interventionalist in state death
penalty proceedings) and Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 532 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (characterizing Court's refusal to reconsider Roe as "needlessly prolong[ing] [the] Court's self-awarded sovereignty over a field where it has little proper
business").
2 Compare Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 132 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(joining Justice O'Connor's concurrence that differed with Justice Scalia's majority opinion
only in its far more expansive reading of Court's power to create "fundamental rights"
qualifying as "liberal interests") with Presley v. Etowah County, 112 S. Ct. 820, 831 (1992)
(holding voting rights act not violated by transfer of decision-making authority from
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not produce their most outspokenly conservative opinions until after their first few terms on the Court. If nothing else, it must be
psychologically difficult to spend several weeks expressing no
opinion on Roe v. Wade and then to turn around one month later
and cast a vote to overrule the case as a legal abomination based
on nothing in the Constitution. Any such moderation Justice
Thomas may have been imbued with during the real hearings was
surely purged from him by the sexual harassment hearings. And
with the Left's luck henceforth in the Thomas affair, the odds are
better than even that Thomas is the sort of man to hold a grudge.
The Left is shadowboxing the apocalypse with its ludicrous position of having to persuade the American people that freedom is
doomed unless every important issue of the day is conclusively decided for them by the majority vote of nine unelected elites. This
will prevent them from stymieing the realignment of constitutional powers that flows naturally from the replacement of social
legislators on the Court with Justices who interpret their own
powers more conservatively. Until the realignment is complete,
however, the stakes will remain high-the entire liberal social
agenda is in the balance. With apologies to the Great Man, ten
Bork defeats would be worth an occasional sexual harassment
hearing along the way.

elected representative to official appointed by majority). Although.Justice Kennedy's voting
record may show the least ideological evolution, his nomination hearings were also
uniquely pro forma and noncontroversial among Reagan-Bush appointees.
" Although Justice Souter has not been on the Court long enough for a realistic comparison of his early voting record with a later voting record, Justice Thomas has clearly
outstripped Justice Souter in the number of opinions and significantly, of dissents he has
written. During Souter's first full calendar year on the Court, he wrote thirteen opinions,
two of them dissents. Search of LEXIS, Genfed library, U.S. file (April 1, 1992). From
January to the end of March, Thomas's first year on the Court, he has written twelve
opinions, three of them dissents. Id. Most strikingly, compare all three Justices early voting
records with Justice Thomas's votes in Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 1005 (1992)
(arguing in dissent that Eighth Amendment not violated by single incident of force by
prison guards against inmate because no significant injury) and Dawson v. Delaware, 1992
U.S. LEXIS 1536, at *19 (Mar. 2, 1992) (sole dissent stating admission of gang membership evidence during sentencing phase in death-penalty case violated Fourth Amendment
because not relevant).

